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GEORGE BAILEY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: ARE WE 
MOVING TO THE POSTMODERN ERA IN INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION WITH BASEL II? 
W. RONALD GARD∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Jimmy Stewart in It’s a Wonderful Life1 plays small town George Bailey, 
“honest, decent, generous to a fault.”2  It’s a Wonderful Life is an extremely well-
known film about how one life matters to the greater world.  But the film also brings 
home the instability of the financial world and how easily lives can be ruined or 
saved.  The most well-known example of this instability is when George is “driven to 
the verge of suicide when his dotty uncle loses a wad of cash that he’s supposed to 
deposit for the family savings and loan.”3  The villain is Mr. Potter (Lionel 
Barrymore), “the avaricious local banker” out to buy George’s family’s savings and 
loan.4  In an earlier scene we see the goodness of George, when he uses money saved 
for his honeymoon trip to forestall a run on the savings and loan.  The film portrays 
a simpler time when one’s small personal savings could avert a bank crisis.  When 
George finds himself years later facing another bank crisis, but this time with no 
similar capital reserve, the townspeople, remembering George’s kindness from years 
past, “begin to empty their pockets into a large basket, thousands of dollars, in 
gratitude for what [George] and his company have done in enriching their lives.”5  
Kindness repaid averts the second banking crisis.   
                                                
∗ J.D., The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, 2005; M.A. in English, California 
State University, Northridge, 1998; Ph.D. in English Literature and Theory, The University of 
Arizona, expected May 2007.  Thank you to Boris Kozolchyk, David Gantz, and Robert Hershey. 
1 IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946). 
2 Bob Thomas, Christmas Classic had an Unpromising Start, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 3, 1997, 
http://www.reelclassics.com/Movies/Wonlife/wonlife-article.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
3 Id.   
4 Roger Ebert, It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), Jan. 1, 1999, 
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19990101/REVIEWS08/401010376/1
023 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
5 It’s a Wonderful Life, http://www149.pair.com/marilynn/IAWL.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
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Today, the small-town savings and loan pitted against the evil small-town 
banker has been replaced by sophisticated global market economies of a scale 
unfathomable to George Bailey and Mr. Potter.  However, the same concerns and 
risks—albeit on a much larger scale—exist today: how does a financial institution 
survive when mistakes, runs on banks, or fraud occurs?  The modern, and now 
postmodern, solution came in the form of the Basel agreements.  The 1988 Basel 
Accord (“Basel I”) established 8%6 of regulatory capital as the minimum 
international standard in order to prevent panics on a global scale like those seen in 
It’s a Wonderful Life.7  Basel II, the latest version being debated and possibly 
implemented in the coming years, carries those concerns and potential solutions into 
the twenty-first century. 
The Basel Accords have had, and will continue to have, a tremendous 
influence on the world’s financial and banking interests, as they rewrite the rules of 
banking.8  These agreements are promulgated, not by governments, but by a small 
committee of elite bankers from high-powered central banks.9  In fact, no national 
legislatures voted to approve Basel I.10  In spite of this, banks all over the world, both 
large and small, in developing and developed countries, have adopted the Basel 
Accords.  It is hardly an overstatement to say that the financial world is under the 
power of Basel.  As Professor John Eatwell writes, “An important part of Britain's 
economic future is being determined by a committee sitting in Basel, Switzerland.”11  
This statement could easily be expanded to encompass the world.  To date, over a 
                                                
6 Riskglossary.com, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
http://www.riskglossary.com/articles/basle_committee.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) [hereinafter 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision]. 
7 In many ways, It’s a Wonderful Life harkens back to the bank closures of the 1920s, where annually in 
the U.S. there were about 500 bank closures due to bank failure.  Many of the failed banks were 
similar to Bailey’s bank, a small, rural one-unit bank.  See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON 
SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1857–1960, at 249 (1963) [hereinafter 
FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ].   
8 See John Eatwell, Basel II: The Regulators Strike Back, THE OBSERVER, June 9, 2002, available at 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,729690,00.html [hereinafter Eatwell, Basel II]. 
9 Id. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. 
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hundred countries have adopted the Basel Accord, now referred to as Basel I,12 and a 
similar situation is expected with Basel II. 
This Article explores the development of these banking regulations as a 
measure of our increasingly globalized world.  The Basel Committee is a window 
into our history and our future.  Basel I sought a solution to the kinds of problems 
George Bailey was facing, although on an international scale, as the local gave way to 
the international.  Even so, in a relatively short time, Basel I was outgrown.  As a 
response, Basel II will institutionalize and legalize a two-tiered banking system, at 
least in the United States.  Such a solution moves us even further from the cultural 
conditions and crises depicted in It’s a Wonderful Life.13  A handful of large 
international banks will follow the new Basel II, while smaller U.S. banks will 
continue to follow Basel I.14  In addition, Basel II will extend beyond banks to reach 
other financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”).15   
Experts and scholars are asking whether Basel II will lead to greater harmony 
and universality within the international banking world.16  Will Basel II bring greater 
stability or, as some predict, new uncertainty?  This Article adds to the dialogue by 
viewing the question through a slightly different lens: that of a world changing from 
a modernist to postmodernist social paradigm.  Just as George Bailey represents the 
simple, pre-modern banking world, Basel I can be read as a modern text on 
                                                
12 L. Jacabo Rodríguez, International Banking Regulation: Where’s the Market Discipline in Basel II?, POL’Y 
ANALYSIS, Oct. 15, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa455.pdf [hereinafter 
Rodríguez].   
13 See Testimony of Roger W. Ferguson, Jr. before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 18, 2003, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2003/20030618/default.htm (last visited Nov. 
9, 2006). 
14 See id. 
15 Eatwell, Basel II, supra note 8. 
16 See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, Sept. 26, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16671335; Analysis: A very traditional approach to 
financial innovation, FT.COM, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1d36d3a0-4d72-11db-8704-
0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=824a0bea-4d72-11db-8704-0000779e2340.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); 
Testimony of Susan Schmidt Bies before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
U.S. Senate, September 26, 2006, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2006/20060926/default.htm (last visited Nov. 
9, 2006).   
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international financial institutional markets, and Basel II as a postmodern text on a 
more complex, globally-linked economic world.  In adding this theoretical scope of 
modernism/postmodernism, we read the evolution of the Basel Agreements as 
reflective of a larger cultural shift, rather than merely as a response to the immediate 
changing conditions. 
Part I presents a brief history, beginning with the creation, development, and 
collapse of Bretton Woods; the resulting 1973 banking crises; and the creation of the 
Basel Committee in 1974.  Part II looks at Basel I.  Part III turns to Basel II, 
including the current concerns and criticisms regarding its implementation.  Part IV 
concludes with a reading of the Basel agreements through modern and postmodern 
theory, as a way to understand the shifts of our increasingly complex and globalized 
village.    
I. THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN ERA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION  
The soon-to-be-implemented Basel II is a response to concerns that Basel I 
is too outdated for our currently complex, international financial world.17  Basel II 
grows out of the work of the Basel Committee, which seeks to standardize banking 
regulation around the world and across jurisdictions.18  It is preceded by the 1975 
Basel Concordat, the Revised Basel Concordat, Basel I, and the 1996 Amendment to 
Basel I.19  All of these developments are fairly recent; this Section places them in 
historical context. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
18 Id. 
19 See Patricia Jackson, International Financial Regulation and Stability, Fin. & Reg. Seminar Series at the 
Judge Inst. of Mgmt., Mar. 8, 2002, at app. 1-3, available at 
http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/publications/index.php?current=5.   
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A. The Creation and Collapse of Bretton Woods 
Seldom can there have been concentrated for the ordering of human affairs so comprehensive a 
combination of economic and political vision, of administrative and technical expertise, of idealism 
and interest. 20 
- Lord Eric Roll, historian and                                    
chairman of a London merchant bank 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s21 encouraged 
the development of the Basel Committee.  It is important to understand this 
economic transition in order to better understand the economic significance of Basel 
I and Basel II within the socioeconomic cultural context.  
World War II brought new extremes of rationalization to a series of 
industries that had been developing in the preceding decades, including “[c]ars, 
shipbuilding, and transport equipment, steel, petrochemicals, rubber, consumer 
electrical goods, and construction.”22  These industries of production, utilizing 
“interlinked financial centres—with the United States and [specifically] New York at 
the apex of its hierarchy— . . . drew in massive supplies of raw materials from” 
around the world. 23  They produced goods that were in turn distributed to “an 
increasingly homogenous mass world market.”24  This system depended on “state-
sponsored reconstruction of war-torn economies, suburbanization particularly in the 
United States, urban renewal, geographical expansion of transport and 
communications systems, and infrastructural development both within and outside 
the advanced capitalist world.”25  It also required a tacit structural agreement between 
the state, increasingly large and profitable corporations, and organized labor.26  The 
                                                
20 MICHAEL MOFFITT, THE WORLD’S MONEY: INTERNATIONAL BANKING FROM BRETTON WOODS 
TO THE BRINK OF INSOLVENCY 14 (1983) [hereinafter MOFFITT]. 
21 See generally id. at 13-40 (describing the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system).  
22 DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 132 (1989) [hereinafter HARVEY]. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 132-34. 
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primary historical factors giving rise to this tacit agreement include expansive U.S. 
industrial production coupled with the need to rebuild European and foreign 
economies to absorb that production.27  For the U.S. to meet those demands, both 
domestically and internationally, however, a new financial world system had to be 
conceived.28  This new financial world came in the form of the Bretton Woods 
system.29  
In 1944, in the midst of World War II, more than 700 delegates from the 
forty-four Allied countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to discuss the 
creation of a set of international financial institutions.30  The delegates were 
beginning to imagine and create what a post-war world would look like, even though 
the war itself would last another full year.31  The Bretton Woods system created the 
World Bank to provide reconstruction money for Europe, and the IMF to provide 
short-term loans for national governments.32  The system also created rules 
governing commercial and financial interactions with countries around the world.33  
The Committee hoped that these measures would help stabilize currencies and avoid 
restrictive exchange practices.34 
Planning for postwar reconstruction had begun as early as 1942.35  The main 
architects of those plans, John Maynard Keynes from Great Britain and Harry 
Dexter White from the United States, oversaw the transformation of these plans into 
an international agreement at the Bretton Woods conference.36  The principal goal of 
                                                
27 Id. at 136-37. 
28 Id. at 137. 
29 Id. 
30  MOFFITT, supra note 20, at 13. 
31 Id. 
32 TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING OF 
DEMOCRACY 189 (2003).   
33 SAMUEL ROSENBERG, AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1945: GROWTH, DECLINE 
AND REJUVENATION 84 (2003) [hereinafter ROSENBERG].  
34 See id.  
35 MOFFITT, supra note 20, at 20. 
36 Id. at 13. 
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Bretton Woods was to stabilize the world’s economy for prosperous world trade.37  
The U.S. sought a postwar economic arrangement that would give it access to 
European and foreign markets as they were rebuilt, and that would allow U.S. 
corporations to invest in those markets through the removal of restrictions on 
international capital flows.38  While access to foreign markets significantly benefited 
the U.S., it was viewed as simultaneously benefiting all nations involved because it 
was believed that the U.S. “could act as an engine for global recovery.”39  In short, 
the U.S. needed access to these rebuilt markets for its industrial surplus and for 
overall growth; reciprocally, these markets needed U.S. resources in order to rebuild 
and develop.  Negotiated in just over three weeks of “marathon discussions,” the 
Bretton Woods Accord established an international framework for what has been 
recognized as “the greatest economic boom in history.”40 
A key feature of Bretton Woods was the means by which it sought both 
“stability and flexibility.”41  Prior to Bretton Woods, through the nineteenth and early 
part of the twentieth centuries, nations by and large “tied their currencies to gold.”42  
This correlation between currency and gold resulted in “the volume of currency in 
circulation [being] limited by the nation’s gold supply.”43  Keynes and White, viewing 
a traditional gold standard as overly restrictive on international economic growth and 
development, sought an alternative; nevertheless, they were forced by practicality “to 
mollify the powerful New York bankers who were staunchly progold.”44  The result 
was a middle ground in which the U.S. dollar was tied to gold, with the U.S. Treasury 
pledging “to redeem foreign dollar holdings in gold at the 1934 price of $35 per 
ounce,”45 while the values of other world currencies were tied to the U.S. dollar.46  
                                                
37 Id. at 20. 
38 See id. (“The aim was to establish new trading rules the major trading companies could live with and 
entrust a new international agency with the authority to enforce them.”). 
39 Id. at 16. 
40 Id. at 14.  
41 Id. at 20. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 21. 
45 Id. 
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History had taught that a single stabilizer was needed,47 and because of U.S. 
hegemonic dominance in the world, that role fell to the U.S.  Further stability in the 
international system was achieved by establishing “fixed exchange rates between 
[world] currencies,” with changes in those rates requiring approval by the IMF.48  
As planned at Bretton Woods, the U.S. dollar, following the end of World 
War II, flooded into western nations, helping many of those nations rebuild and 
develop vibrant industrial economies.49  For more than a decade, the strength of the 
U.S. dollar fostered an unparalleled economic boom, with the U.S. benefiting above 
all others.50  What was unforeseen, however, was how quickly a U.S. dollar 
overhang—the excess of U.S. dollars in circulation beyond what U.S. gold reserves 
could satisfy—would emerge in the international arena.  What was unimaginable at 
the close of World War II appeared as a stark reality by 1958: the number of U.S. 
dollars circulating worldwide and guaranteed by the U.S. as exchangeable for gold at 
$35 an ounce threatened, in short order, to exceed the U.S. gold supply should 
foreign nations suddenly choose to cash them in.51  By 1960, a number of foreign 
governments began to fear a devaluation of the U.S. dollar and began converting a 
portion of their U.S. currency holdings; the feared projection became a reality.52 
The U.S. was able to sustain the Bretton Woods system for more than a 
decade beyond this point.53  However, throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s the 
system experienced increasing strain from many different sources, most importantly 
the U.S. balance of payments crisis that emerged in the late 1950s and continued to 
worsen.54  The shortage of U.S. dollars that made them so valuable following World 
                                                                                                                                   
46 ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 86. 
47 MOFFITT, supra note 20, at 19. 
48 Id. at 21. 
49 See ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 97, 93 (“European economies . . . experienced[d] a great 
economic boom in the 1950s and 1960s.”). 
50 MOFFITT, supra note 20, at 14. 
51 ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 97. 
52 Id. at 97-98. 
53 See id. at 179 (“[B]y August 1971, the Nixon Administration had concluded that the Bretton Woods 
system had outlived its usefulness for the United States.”).  
54 See id. at 103-04. 
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War II had become a glut by the early 1970s.55  This growing glut threatened a forced 
devaluation and, ultimately—because the U.S. dollar underpinned the system of 
exchange and value—an unraveling of the entire Bretton Woods structure.  
Ironically, when this did finally occur in the early 1970s, U.S. banks and corporations 
were at the fore in bringing about its demise.56   
U.S. banks experienced a slow international expansion through the 1950s and 
into the 1960s as they followed U.S. corporations abroad in pursuit of foreign direct 
investment and market opportunities.57  Following 1965, however, international 
banking began to come into its own.58  This coincided with the rise of the Eurodollar 
market.59  Operating “as a kind of dollar market in exile,”60 the Eurodollar market 
provided a structure and means for U.S. banks and corporations to transact beyond 
U.S. regulatory oversight.61  With this structure in place, and as the U.S. dollar 
became increasingly vulnerable at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Eurodollar market functioned as the platform from which banks (U.S. and 
otherwise) could attack and further devalue the U.S. dollar.62  As one commentator 
notes, this was nothing short of “a struggle between governments and the private 
banks for control over the international monetary system.”63 
In the early 1970s, with the U.S. dollar already demonstrably weak, 
“corporations and banks, anticipating a devaluation, sold dollars on Europe’s money 
markets in order to reduce their cash exposure in dollars.”64  The U.S., after 
                                                
55 See MOFFITT, supra note 20, at 34. 
56 See id. at 77. 
57 Id. at 42-44. 
58 Id. at 50. 
59 See id. at 46-48. 
60 Id. at 46. 
61 See id. at 66 (“Being transnational, the Euromarket is virtually free of all government regulation.”). 
62 See id. at 74-75, 77. 
63 Id. at 71. 
64 Id. at 77.  
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repeatedly failing in its efforts to prop up the value of the dollar, finally succumbed 
to economic pressures.65  In March 1973, in an effort to halt the U.S. dollar’s decline 
in value, the foreign currency markets were closed (for the second time); when they 
reopened two and a half weeks later, currency values were allowed to float.66  
Although initially intended to be a temporary condition, the continued speculation 
against the U.S. dollar, which further devalued it, made the economic reality quickly 
apparent: the Bretton Woods system was no more.67 
The 1970s saw the dissolution of many of the fundamental economic 
structural tenets that were put in place as part of the Bretton Woods agreement 
established at the end of World War II.  With its collapse, longstanding financial 
controls were abolished, including exchange controls, quantitative controls on credit, 
and domestic restrictions.68  By the end of the Bretton Woods era, new modern 
banking had come into existence;69 within a few years, the need for modern banking 
regulations would be manifestly apparent.70  Just as Bretton Woods helped expand 
and stabilize a post-war world, new agreements were needed to keep the banking and 
financial worlds stable.  Because so many banks were now linked internationally, 
bank failure in one part of the world could trigger economic disaster in another part 
of the world.  This possibility was brought home in 1974. 
B. The Herstatt Debacle 
A number of reasons are given for the need to regulate financial and banking 
markets, namely the protection of customers from lack of transparency, monopoly 
power of a few banks operating within a particular market, and criminal activities by 
banks and others.71  As the world becomes more global, the need for international 
                                                
65See id. at 73-75. 
66 Id. at 75. 
67 Id. 
68 Eatwell, Basel II, supra note 8. 
69 See MOFFITT, supra note 20, at 44-55. 
70 SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 361 (2005) [hereinafter HEFFERNAN]. 
71 Id. at 173-74. 
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regulation increases.72  This need could not have been demonstrated better than it 
was in the summer of 1974. 
Two bank failures in 1974 spurred the creation of the Basel Committee.  One 
of these failures has come to be known as the Herstatt Debacle, a banking crisis that 
was initiated in Germany, but proceeded to spread around the world.  On June 26, 
1974, Bank Herstatt, a German bank, was forced into liquidation by German 
regulators.73  The bank had run up huge “losses from foreign exchange trading, 
which were originally estimated at £83 million but rose to £200 million.”74  In that 
instance “a number of banks had released payment of DEM to Herstatt in Frankfurt 
in exchange for USD . . .to be delivered in New York.  Because of the time-zone 
differences, Herstatt ceased operations between . . . respective payments.  The 
counterparty banks did not receive their USD payments.”75  As Heffernan explains, 
The bank’s failure is famous because it exposed a weakness in the 
system related to liquidity risk.  Bankhaus Herstatt was due to settle 
the purchase of Deutsche marks (DMs, in exchange for dollars) on 
26 June.  On that day, the German correspondent banks, on 
instruction from the American banks, debited their German accounts 
and deposited the DMs in the Landes Central bank (which was acting 
as a clearing house).  The American banks expected to be repaid in 
dollars, but Bankhaus Herstatt was closed at 4 p.m., German time.  It 
was only 10 a.m. on the US east coast, causing these banks to lose 
out because they were caught in the middle of a transaction.  The US 
payments system was put under severe strain.  The risk associated 
with the failure to meet interbank payment obligations has since 
become known as Herstatt risk.  In February 1984, the chairman of 
the bank was convicted of fraudulently concealing foreign exchange 
losses of DM 100 million in the bank’s 1973 accounts.76 
                                                
72 Eatwell, Basel II, supra note 8. 
73 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
74 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 361. 
75 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
76 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 361. 
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The Hertstatt bank was considered a failed bank.77  But Herstatt was not the 
only bank failure that year.  A month before, Franklin National Bank (“FNB”) in the 
U.S. also faced serious problems.  This bank was the twentieth largest in the U.S., 
with deposits of close to $3 billion.78  It too “suffered very large foreign exchange 
losses and could not pay its quarterly dividend.  It transpired that in addition to these 
losses, the bank had made a large volume of unsound loans, as part of a rapid growth 
strategy.”79  These revelations led large depositors to withdraw their money; it was 
later discovered that its largest shareholder, Michele Sindona, had used the bank to 
“channel funds illegally around the world.”80 
The Herstatt Debacle and FNB’s problems ultimately led to the creation of 
the Basel Committee.81  But this was far from the first instance of a bank failure or 
mismanagement.  As many have noted, international and global banking began with 
the first instances of trade hundreds of years ago,82 and banks have been subject to 
regulations concerned with safety and soundness of the banking system since at least 
the 1930s, following the stock market crash.83  Why, then, was there considered a 
need for a new banking accord in the 1980s, and again for the twenty-first century?  
Why do banks need to be regulated on a global scale?   
                                                
77 A bank is deemed to have “failed” if it is liquidated; merged with a healthy bank under central 
government supervision or pressure; or rescued with state financial support.  See HEFFERNAN, supra 
note 70, at 352. 
78 Id. at 361.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 362.  Heffernan writes, “In March 1985 [Michele Sindona] died from poisoning, a few days 
after being sentenced to life imprisonment in Italy for arranging the murder of an investigator of his 
banking empire.”  Id. 
81 See Basel Committee, History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, March 2001, at 1, available at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc101.pdf. 
82 Jaime Caruana, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, 
What Next for Basel? (Oct. 9, 2003), available at http://www.bde.es/prensa/intervenpub/archivo/ 
caruana/091003e.pdf#search=%22Remarks%20of%20Governor%20Jaime%20Caruana%2C%20Cha
irman%20of%20the%20Basel%20Committee%20on%20Banking%20Supervision“What%20Next%2
0for%20Basel%3F”%22. 
83 See Kenneth E. Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 
687, 696 (1980).   
2006]       GEORGE BAILEY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  ARE WE MOVING         173 
TO THE POSTMODERN ERA IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION WITH BASEL II? 
 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that in the 1970s and 1980s, as Harper and 
Chan note, “banking systems around the world were substantially deregulated, 
reflecting a prevailing view that regulation had become a distorting influence on the 
industry, no longer serving its original public policy goals.”84  What changed is how 
regulatory systems are seen.  Previously, “[r]egulation of banks has usually come in 
the form of entry restrictions, limits on activities, geographical restrictions, reserve 
requirements, and capital requirements.”85  Governments feared finance wars, and 
therefore began regulating interest rates and other activities.86  Now, regulation tends 
to be seen as a means to “safety and soundness” in banking on a larger, global 
scale.87  Both Basel I and Basel II address this view: international regulation 
requirements keep banks stable and the markets less vulnerable to bank failures.88  
The focus on how to prevent more Herstatt crises, the Basel Committee believes, is a 
focus on risk-weighted capital adequacy regulations.89 
What happened with Herstatt is known as contagion, when the spread of one 
bank’s problems infect other banks and the banking system as a whole. 90  This 
creates systemic risk, which can cause problems across the entire global  
financial system, leading to widespread bank runs by wholesale and 
retail depositors, and possibly, collapse of the banking system.  An 
extensive collapse will result in the loss of intermediation, money 
transmission and liquidity services offered by banks which, in turn, 
                                                
84 Ian R. Harper & Tom C.H. Chan, The Future of Banking:  A Global Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF 
BANKING 30, 37 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2003) [hereinafter Harper & Chan]. 
85 See GEORGE J. BENSTON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CRITIQUE AND SOME PROPOSALS 
80-84 (1998); Randall S. Kroszner, Financial Regulation, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS 419, 421 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994) [hereinafter Kroszner]; Edward J. Kane, Ethical 
Foundations of Financial Regulations, 12 J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 51, 51-52 (1997); CHARLES GOODHART 
ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHY, HOW AND WHERE NOW? 189-202 (1998). 
86 See Kroszner, supra note 85, at 420; Harper & Chan, supra note 84, at 37.   
87 Harper & Chan, supra note 84, at 37. 
88 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6.   
89 Id.  
90 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 175.  See generally Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, Contagion 
and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Bank Panic, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 863 
(1997) (discussing the “social costs of asymmetric-information induced bank panics in an 
environment without government deposit insurance”). 
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will cause an inefficient allocation of resources in the economy.  In 
the extreme, the economy could revert to barter exchange.91 
But in regulating and protecting banks, society also runs into a moral hazard 
problem: when the government determines that one sector of society is too 
important to fail (and thus is given insurance), it gives that sector latitude to 
misbehave or participate in riskier ventures.92   
To prevent such catastrophic losses, both in the local and global arena, 
national banking systems created special regulations for banks—so-called “prudential 
regulation”—which sought to minimize the social costs of bank failures.93  Most of 
these regulations were on the micro level, including Basel I and Basel II.94  They set 
requirements of what banks must do to keep from being in the precarious position 
of failing.95  But some scholars, including Claudio Borio, believe we should be 
looking at the macro level as well.96  Borio argues that banks should be seen as a 
collective whole, all engaged in similar activities; therefore, problems can arise that 
affect them simultaneously.97   
Prudential regulation, however, has become key in the global banking 
environment, mainly in order to prevent another Herstatt.98  Prudential regulation 
                                                
91 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 175. 
92 Id. at 176. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. (“As this chapter proceeds, it will become apparent that prudential regulation focuses on 
bank regulation at the micro level, i.e. ensuring that each bank behaves in a prudent manner, to 
prevent systemic failure arising from contagion if one bank fails.”). 
95 See id. 
96 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 176; Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial 
Supervision and Regulation?, 49 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 181, 182 (2003), available at 
http://cesifo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/49/2/181. 
97 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 176. 
98 Boris Kozolchyk explains,  
The notion of prudential regulation is central to an understan[d]ing of what is being 
attempted, especially by Basle II [sic].  Central bankers differ in their understanding 
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takes the form of deposit insurance, capital requirements, licensing and examination 
of banks, and intervention when banks get into trouble.99  It is designed to ensure the 
stability of banking, without banks taking advantage of their position.100  Compliance 
costs go down if all international banks are required to meet the same standards.101  
The knowledge that specific standards are in place builds confidence in both 
domestic and foreign banks, and provides stability from bank failure.102  And, 
prudential regulation levels the playing field, allowing smaller banks to compete in a 
global market.  This Article looks specifically at the capital requirements established 
in Basel I, the 1998 revisions, and Basel II. 
C. Basel(s) and the Need for Global/International Regulation of Risk-
Weighted Capital Adequacy in Banks, or the Birth of the Modern Era 
The Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (the 
“Basel Committee”) is credited with starting the modern era in banking regulation.103  
When the 1974 crises occurred, “[t]he failure of that German firm had seriously 
threatened the American banking system, an eventuality that neither German nor US 
                                                                                                                                   
of this type of regulation.  To some, practically anything goes under the heading of 
“prudential”, they tend to read language such as the one in your paper (referring to 
a combination of deposit insurance, margins, reserves, inspections[,] etc) as 
amounting to prudential regulation.  Others, more correctly, I believe, see 
prudential regulation as a providing some upper and lower of limits for various 
measurements of liquidity, safety and soundness rules and then allowing banks to 
operate within those limits. 
Email from Boris Kozolchyk to W. Ronald Gard (Dec. 7, 2005) (on file with author).   
99 See id.   
100 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 176. 
101 Id. 
102 Patricia Jackson, William Perraudin & Victoria Saporta, Regulatory and ‘Economic’ Solvency Standards for 
Internationally Active Banks 9, at 11 (Bank of England, Working Paper No. 1368-5562, 2001), available at 
www.bis.org/bcbs/events/b2eajps.pdf. 
103 The Federal Reserve, Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0903lead.pdf [hereinafter FRB Capital Standards 
for Banks].  
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regulators were, at that time, properly equipped to tackle.”104  The Basel Committee 
was formed as a response “to the cross-jurisdictional implications of the Herstatt 
debacle” as well as the problems with FNB the same year .105  The Committee was 
supposed to coordinate and establish regulatory conditions among banks to prevent 
a similar debacle.106  The Committee is comprised of individuals from central banks 
and regulatory authorities from the G-10 countries, which include Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.107 While not having legislative or any other formal 
authority, the Basel Committee does require its member countries to implement its 
recommendations, although with flexibility, of course. 108  The Committee meets 
every three months in Basel at the Bank for International Settlements.109   
The Committee was formed to look at regulatory practices and issues of 
international banks in member countries, and “to use concordats and agreements to 
prevent any international banking operation from escaping effective supervision.”110  
In short, it seeks to prevent another Herstatt.  The Committee pursues three primary 
objectives:  “[1] define roles of regulators in cross-jurisdictional situations; [2] ensure 
that international banks or bank holding companies do not escape comprehensive 
supervision by a ‘home’ regulatory authority; [and 3] promote uniform capital 
requirements so banks from different countries may compete with one another on a 
‘level playing field.’”111  Throughout its history, Basel has expanded its scope and 
                                                
104 John Eatwell, The New International Financial Architecture: Promise or Threat?, available at 
http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/publications/files/Cambridge-MIT%20lecture%2022.5.pdf. 
105 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 The Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) provides revenue for the permanent secretariat, 
and is owned by the central banks.  It plays no role in policy-making.  Formed in 1930, the BIS is one 
of the oldest international financial institutions.  It is actively involved in securing and maintaining 
international central banks cooperation. See Bank for International Settlements, BIS History – 
Overview, http://www.bis.org/about/history.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006). 
110 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 180. 
111 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
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depth of sophistication.  The first Basel Agreement came in 1975, where home and 
host countries were given specific supervisory responsibility in particular areas, such 
as liquidity and solvency.112   
D. Further Crises in 1982 
Each new edition seeks to fill gaps.  The Revised Basel Concordat in 1983, 
for example, did just that, after another series of bank failures, including the failures 
of Banco Ambrosiano and its subsidiary in 1982.113  “As a result . . . the Concordat 
was revised so that home and host supervisors now have joint responsibility for 
solvency problems of subsidiaries and liquidity problems from either a subsidiary or 
branch.”114  In addition, a second event put pressure on the Basel Committee to 
maintain stability in the international financial markets; in August 1982, Mexico 
announced that it was  
unable to roll over its debt to private creditors and would therefore 
be forced to suspend principal payments.  Soon after, other 
developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, 
among others, found themselves in financial difficulties.  U.S. banks, 
which had lent recklessly to Latin American countries in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, faced huge losses.  Indeed, the nine largest U.S. 
banks had loans outstanding to the most indebted countries that were 
equivalent to almost twice their capital at the end of 1982.  Those 
banks had also lent 140 percent of their capital to Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina.  Although U.S. banks curtailed substantially their lending 
to developing nations after Mexico’s announcement, they still faced 
the possibility of becoming insolvent if the debtor countries 
                                                
112 See generally Banks for International Settlements, Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign 
Establishments (May 1983), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc312.pdf (describing “the responsibilities 
of banking supervisory authorities for monitoring the prudential conduct and soundness of the 
business of banks’ foreign establishments”).  
113 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 180-81.  The bank failed “after its Chairman, Roberto Calvo, was 
found hanging from Blackfriars Bridge in London.  Depositors panicked upon hearing the news; a 
lifeboat rescue was launched by the Bank of Italy ($325 million), but the bank was declared bankrupt 
in late August 1982.”  Id.  
114 Id. at 181. 
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defaulted.  It was at this stage that the U.S. government orchestrated 
a resolution to the crisis.115   
The U.S. gave loans to Mexico, and instructed the IMF to give rescue packages to 
the other countries.116  The U.S. Congress made efforts to provide additional loans to 
developing countries caught in the crisis, but only in exchange for new regulations in 
the banking industry, “including higher capital requirements.”117 
The idea of new regulations concerned the U.S. banking community; in 
particular, U.S. banks feared they would be less competitive with Japanese and 
German banks, so there was a great push to make the new regulations 
international.118  The first step towards international regulations came in 1986 when 
the U.S. and the U.K. signed a bilateral treaty agreeing to minimum capital 
standards.119  With these two powerhouses behind international regulations, the G-10 
(Basel) Committee was presented with a proposal.  The U.S. also threatened to apply 
the new minimum capital regulation standards to international banks operating 
within the U.S.120  In 1987, the Basel Committee began discussions, with the U.S. and 
the U.K. on one side of the table, and Japan on the other.121 
II. THE 1988 BASEL ACCORD 
 The Basel Accord was released in 1988; it “proposed a set of minimum 
capital requirements for banks.”122  These requirements became law in 1992 in the G-
10 countries, with Japanese banks requiring an extended period to comply.123  The 
                                                
115 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 6. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.    
118 Id. at 6-7. 
119 Id. at 7. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
123 Id. 
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goal of the Basel Accord was to gain greater stability for international banks.124  This 
was done by focusing on the supervision of banking operations.  “The 1988 Basel 
Accord established a single set of capital adequacy standards for international banks 
of participating countries from January 1993.”125  Now known as Basel I, it required 
“all international banks to set aside capital based on the (Basel) risk assets ratio”: 
capital/weighted risk assets.126 
The Basel Accord applies only to banks; it does not apply to securities firms 
(investment banks or broker-dealers).127  The U.S., the U.K., and Japan distinguish 
between the two, while the other G-10 countries have “a tradition of universal 
banking.”128  “Banking” in this sense is the act of “deposit taking and lending,” 
which are the activities that constitute commercial banking under U.S. law.129  The 
primary issue addressed by the Basel Accord is credit risk.130  
A. Framework for Measuring Risk 
The 1988 Basel Accord created a four-part “framework for measuring capital 
adequacy in relation to credit risk”:  1) defining what is capital; 2) determining risk-
weighing rates for types of assets; 3) determining the ratio of capital required for 
each risk-weighed assets; and 4) determining the conversion of off-balance sheet 
assets to risk-weighed assets.131 
 
 
                                                
124 See Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, A Speculation on the Future of the Bank for International Settlements, 18 
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 231, 236 (2005). 
125 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 182. 
126 Id. 
127 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 7. 
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1. Determining Capital:  Tiers 1 and 2 
Basel I divided a bank’s capital into two tiers.132  Tier 1 was comprised of 
“core capital,” which included “common equity shares, disclosed reserves, non-
cumulative preferred stock, other hybrid equity instruments, retained earnings, 
minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries, less goodwill and other deductions.”133  
Tier 2 was comprised of “supplementary capital,” which included “(1) upper tier 2-
capital such as cumulative perpetual preferred stock, loan loss allowances, 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves (discounted by 55%) such as equity or 
property where the value changes, general loan loss reserves, hybrid debt instruments 
. . . and (2) lower tier 2-subordinated debt . . . .”134   
Basel I also defined the amount of each type of capital a bank could hold.135  
Tier 2 capital was limited to a maximum equivalent of Tier 1 capital.136  
“Subordinated debt [was] limited to a maximum of 50 percent of Tier 1 capital.  
General loan-loss reserves are limited to a maximum of 25 percent of Tier 2 
capital.”137 
2. Five Risk Rates 
Currently, there are five risks rates under Basel I: 0%, 10%, 20%, 50%, and 
100%, which are applied to various risk categories.138  These rates apply to both tiers 
of capital.139  One of the greatest complaints against the system is that qualitative 
                                                
132 See HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 182. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 7-8. 
136 Id.   
137 Id. at 8. 
138 FRB Capital Standards for Banks, supra note 103, at 396 n.2. 
139 Gary A. Goodman & Robert W. Becker, The New Basel II Capital Accord: Business and Legal Challenges 
for Real Estate Lenders, 120 BANKING L.J. 309, 310 (2003) (“Capital is defined as consisting of Tier 1 
and Tier 2.”).  
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differences in the risk categories are not taken into consideration.140  For instance, in 
the U.S., all commercial loans are weighted at 100% and all residential loans at 
50%.141  This is one of the motivating factors for Basel II’s revised system, which 
accounts for the qualitative differences with great force.142  
Basel I assigned risk weights to each category, with a lower rating indicating 
the more credit-worthy and lower risk.143  Zero percent risk weight included cash, 
gold, and bonds issued by OECD governments.144  Twenty percent risk weight 
included bonds issued by agencies of the OECD governments, local governments, 
and insured mortgages.145  Fifty percent risk weight included uninsured mortgages.146  
One hundred percent risk weight included all corporate loans and claims by non-
OECD banks, and government debt, equity, and property.147  Key to this Article, 
“[o]ff-balance sheet instruments (e.g. letters of credit, futures, swaps, forex 
arrangements) were converted into ‘credit risk equivalents’, and weighted by the type 
of counterparty to a given claim.  Again, OECD government counterparties receive a 
0% weight; 20% for OECD banks and public sector agencies.”148 
3. Eight Percent Capital Requirement 
The Basel Accord subjects banks to an 8% capital requirement, which 
requires the capital divided by the credit risk to measure greater than 8%.149  This 
                                                
140 See, e.g., FRB Capital Standards for Banks, supra note 103, at 396 (“As implemented in the United 
States, [Basel I] specifies only four levels of risk, even though loans assigned the same risk weight (for 
example, 100 percent for commercial loans) can vary greatly in credit quality.”). 
141 Id. 
142 See Dwight C. Smith III, Basel II: An Update, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Feb. 1, 2004, at 27. 
143 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 182. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (emphasis added).  
149 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 6. 
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requirement represents an indicator of a bank’s financial strength, and many 
institutions exceed this minimum.  Of that 8%, a minimum of 4% must be from Tier 
I capital. 150  
For example, “if a bank has assets in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds worth 
$100, the capital charge required for those assets is zero.”151  This is because 
government bonds are given a risk weight of 0%.152  “If, alternatively, a bank has 
assets in the form of corporate bonds worth $100, the capital charge required is 
equal to $8, of which at least $4 must be in Tier 1 capital.”153  This is because 
corporate loans and bonds are weighted at 100%;154 therefore, one must calculate the 
8% requirement from the full amount of the bond, in this case $100.  So, $8 is 
required to be held as a capital charge, $4 of which must come from Tier 1 capital.  
The Basel system is based on the idea that having reserve capital requirements will 
lessen the likelihood of panic, contagion, and bank failure. 
4. Off-balance Sheet Items 
Off-balance sheet items include letters of credit and other transactions that 
banks carry on as part of their daily business.155  These are given the risk-weights of 
“100 percent for instruments that substitute for loans, such as standby letters of 
credit; 50 percent for transaction-related contingencies, such as standby letters of 
credit for a particular transaction; and 20 percent for short-term, self-liquidating 
trade-related contingent liabilities, such as commercial letters of credit.”156  So, a 
commercial letter of credit worth $100 is a 20% risk-weighted asset.  Eight percent 
of $20, or $1.60, is the capital charge required.  A stand-by letter of credit for $100 
                                                
150 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 8. 
151 Id.   
152 See id. at 8, tbl. 1. 
153 Id. at 8-9. 
154 See id. at 8, tbl. 1. 
155 See Wikipedia, Off-balance-sheet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Off-balance-sheet (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2006) (“Off balance sheet usually means an asset or debt or financing activity not on the 
company’s balance sheet.  It could involve . . . a contingent liability such as a letter of credit.”). 
156 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 8 tbl. 1. 
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would have a risk-weight of 50%, so the capital charge would be eight percent of 
$50. 
B. Evening the Playing Field 
Through Basel I, the Basel Committee sought to bring greater stability to the 
financial world.157  It also hoped to provide a more even playing field.158  The benefit 
of a system like Basel I is that it is easy to figure out the rates.  The capital charge of 
a stand-by letter of credit is a known quantity; that will not necessarily be the case 
under Basel II.   
C. Basel Amendment 1996:  The Addition of Market Risks 
The 1996 amendment to Basel I added market risks to the equation.  A 
market risk is defined as the risks (a) “in the trading book of debt and equity 
instruments and related off-balance-sheet contracts and (b) foreign exchange and 
commodities risks.”159  The amendment “introduced a more direct treatment of off-
balance sheet items rather than converting them into credit risk equivalents, as was 
done in the original Basel I.”160  A Tier 3 capital was also added, which was defined 
as “short-term subordinated debt (with a maturity of less than 2 years), which meets 
a number of conditions stipulated in the agreement, including a requirement that 
neither the interest nor principal can be repaid if it results in the bank falling below 
its minimum capital requirement.”161  A bank could adopt either an internal model or 
                                                
157 Abhijit Ghosh, Solution Framework for Credit Risk Under BASEL II, BUS. CREDIT, Mar. 1, 2004, at 56.  
This is the same justification of Basel II as well.  See, e.g., Susan Schmidt Bies Delivers Remarks on 
Current Banking Issues at The British Bankers’ Association 10th Annual Supervision Conference, 
FDCH CAPITAL TRANSCRIPTS, Oct. 11, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 17587348 (“Basel II is intended 
to promote the stability of the U.S. financial system by ensuring the safety of and soundness of the 
largest U.S. banks.”); Ben Bernanke Delivers Remarks On Basel II at The Federal Reserve Bank Of 
Chicago’s 42nd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, FDCH CAPITAL 
TRANSCRIPTS, May 18, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 8540694 (“It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that the core goal of Basel II is to promote the stability of the U.S. financial system by 
ensuring the safety and soundness of U.S. banks.”). 
158  Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 1. 
159 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate 
Market Risks 1 n.2 (Jan. 1996), available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf. 
160 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 186. 
161 Id. at 187. 
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standardized model for determining its capital charge and market risk.162  Under the 
current Basel rules, more sophisticated banks may employ their own advanced risk 
models if the country regulator approves.163 
III. BASEL II 
A. The Growing Need for Basel II 
1. The Asian Financial Crisis  
The Asian Crisis “in the Fall of 1998 was the first post-World War II crisis in 
which events in emerging market economies seriously threatened the financial 
stability of the West, and where the origins of the crisis were clearly to be found in 
the workings of liberalised markets and private sector institutions.” 164  Lord Eatwell 
explains, 
The spark was the financial crisis that overwhelmed many of the 
Asian economies in 1997, and spread to Russia in 1998.  But the 
centre of the conflagration was the near failure of the hedge fund 
Long Term Capital Management.  More than any of the other 
problems in the Fall of 1998, the threats that LTCM’s difficulties 
posed to financial stability throughout the world illustrated 
beyond all reasonable doubt that the international financial 
system had entered a new era. This was not a problem of 
sovereign debt, or macroeconomic imbalance, or even a foreign 
exchange crisis.  Instead it was the manifestation of the systemic 
risk created by the market driven decisions of a private firm.165 
                                                
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 John Eatwell, The New International Financial Architecture: Promise or Threat?, May 22, 2002, at 6, 
available at http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/publications/files/Cambridge-MIT%20lecture%2022.5.pdf. 
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Some believe that the Asian crisis occurred in part because of Basel I.166  
Basel I encouraged short-term loans to other banks because it assigned a 20% risk-
weight to short-term loans to banks, instead of the 100% risk-weight assigned to 
loans to non-banks.167  This choice is believed to have contributed to the crisis, as 
Asian banks took advantage of the increased borrowing opportunities and the rest of 
the world took advantage of lending to banks.168  “Sixty percent of the $380 billion in 
international bank lending to Asia at the end of 1997 had a maturity of one year or 
less” because loans under a year in length required no capital need regulations. 169 
2. Circumventing Basel I:  Regulatory Arbitrage 
The Asian financial crisis of 1998 is credited, in part, with creating the need 
for a revised Basel accord.170  The fixed risk-weight scheme under Basel I also led to 
another consequence: banks began engaging in regulatory arbitrage.171  Regulatory 
arbitrage is defined as “using a financial instrument or transaction to reduce capital 
requirements without a corresponding reduction in the risk incurred.”172  The Asian 
bank crisis could be seen as an example of regulatory arbitrage.173  William 
McDonough, president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision explained, “One 
significant weakness is that the Accord’s broad brush structure may provide banks 
with an unintended incentive to take on higher risk exposures without requiring 
                                                
166 See, e.g., Rudi Bonte et al., Supervisory Lessons to be Drawn from the Asian Crisis 26-33 (Basel Comm. on 
Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 2, 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp2. 
htm. 
167 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 11. 
168 See id. 
169 Id.  
170 See Lee Hsien Loong, Post Crisis Asia – The Way Forward,   ASIAN BANKER J., Oct. 4, 2000, available 
at http://www.emeap.org/review/0011/sg2109.htm. 
171 See Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 433, 450 (2001); Bothersome Basel, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004, at 5-8.  
172 HEFFERNAN, supra note 70, at 185. 
173 Another example is called “cherry picking,” which “involves the holding of riskier assets within a 
given category.” Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 10. 
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them to hold a commensurate amount of capital.”174  Basel II is supposed to end 
regulatory arbitrage because riskiness will be included as a factor in measuring the 
need of capital reserve, but some are not so sure.175  Again, economists cite Basel I’s 
preference of equity over debt.176  One economist concludes, “For a given perceived 
differential between the cost of equity and the cost of debt financing, incentives to 
take RCA [Regulatory Capital Arbitrage], therefore, are related negatively to the 
associated structuring costs, and positively to the extent to which RCA permits debt to 
be substituted for equity.”177  
3. Different Needs for Large International Financial Institutions 
The U.S. Federal Reserve Board believes that Basel I works very well for 
most financial institutions.178  It believes, however, that a new Basel accord is needed 
for more complex, large, financial institutions; it is to those institutions that Basel II 
is directed.179  Because the art of risk management has evolved, Basel I’s crude 
system of four categories of risk-weighing should be replaced with a more 
sophisticated, more qualitative determination.180  As the banking community has 
become increasingly concentrated, Basel I started seeming outdated.181  Big 
                                                
174 William J. McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York, 
The Impact of Today’s Technology on Banking and the Financial Markets (Sept. 20, 2000), available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2000/mcdon000920.html.   
175 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 15 (“As the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, a group of 
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Revised Capital Accord Proposal 1-2 (Feb. 26, 2001), available at 
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international banks want to use their own risk-management software and calculations 
to include riskier credit and other factors not used in Basel I.182 
B. The Imminent Arrival of Basel II 
With the Asian financial crisis, the spread of regulatory arbitrage, and the 
development of sophisticated risk-management systems in large international banks, 
critics began to feel that Basel I was becoming outmoded.  In 2001, a new proposal 
was introduced in the Basel Committee.183  Comments from outside the elite group 
of the Basil Committee were encouraged, and the committee received over 250 
responses.184  The Basel Committee conducted three impact statements as well.185  
More changes were made to the agreement, and a new agreement was reached in 
May 2004.186   
Basel II significantly revises the concept of regulatory capital.  “Future capital 
requirements are to be far more flexible, and more closely aligned to free market 
forces.”187  Moreover, the one-size-fits-all approach of Basel I has been replaced with 
a more complex mix-and-match system.  There is great criticism of Basel II from a 
myriad of camps.188  This Section tries to understand just what Basel II will do when 
it is finally implemented in 2007.   
Whereas Basel I had a three-tiered system focused on capital, Basel II will 
have a three-pillar system, and although the change in name does not make it 
obvious, the ordering of Basel II is something distinctly new from the more 
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simplified Basel I agreement.189  Minimum capital requirements continue to be the 
focus of Basel II, but their determination and monitoring is much more complex.190   
Basel II is different from Basel I in that it focuses on specific variables, rather 
than broad categories for determining credit risk.191  Just as the 1998 amendment 
expanded the formula to include market risks, Basel II goes significantly further in 
that direction.  “The core idea of Basel II is that market disciplines, whether direct or 
mediated through banks’ own risk-modelling, should be placed at the heart of 
financial regulation.” 192    
Does Basel II slide too close to the business of banks, rather than regulating 
them?  We have seen this trend in other areas, including laws protecting the 
environment.  When businesses that hurt the environment help write the regulations, 
the environment may not be the first focus of protection.  Similarly, many are 
concerned that the regulations will not provide adequate protection in a banking 
crisis.193  As Eatwell explains,  
But the reason regulators exist is that markets don't always work 
efficiently to achieve society's goals.  Just as the environmental 
watchdog is there because the market encourages polluting behaviour 
(imposing costs on society as a whole rather than the polluter), so the 
financial regulator is there because financial risk takers expose society 
to far greater losses than they might suffer themselves. 194 
Pillar One concerns the core element of Basel I, namely determining how 
much regulatory capital a bank must have on hand.195  The Tier 1 and 2 system 
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continues in Basel II, as does the 8% capital requirement.196  The significant change 
comes in how to calculate the risk-weight for individual assets.197  This will be based 
on a more complex calculation than anything seen in Basel I, even the 1998 
amendment. 
Under Basel II, there would be three options for measuring credit risk: one 
standardized approach and two internal-ratings-based approaches (“IRBs”).198  The 
standardized approach continues with fixed risk-weighing categories (adding more 
categories), but adds a qualitative component through external credit ratings “to 
evaluate corporate risk exposures.”199  The IRBs focus their analysis on the 
qualitative elements in greater proportion, and can be determined by the banks 
themselves.200  The more simplified IRB focuses on the probability of loan default, 
whereas in the more complex version, the bank would determine all of the risks 
associated with the particular transaction.201    
The benefit of the new system is that it will give weight to the qualitative 
differences in banks’ choices, rather than treating types of finance as blanket 
categories.202  This is known as the IRB compliance, and is far more complicated 
than the Basel I formulas.203  For those who see this as a positive step,  
[t]hese investments enable banks to realise more consistent profits 
and reduced volatility of credit losses by taking a structured and 
consistent view of risk management.  Also, banks may actually realise 
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an increase in profits in the form of lower provisions, consistent risk 
spreading, more effective deployment of capital and loss avoidance.204 
Some believe that this will lead to better decisions on the day-to-day level of 
the bank, because the new system rewards quality, rather than merely quantity: 
“differentiating risk on an asset-by-asset level adds transparency to the credit 
decision-making process and empowers better economic decision making.”205  On a 
second level, some see Basel II as leading to greater consistency within a bank’s 
internal risk systems.206   
There is also a new charge for operational risk that is factored into the 
former 8% capital requirement.207  Operational risk is “defined as ‘the risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events.’”208  The new formula includes credit risk + market risk + 
operational risk.209  The measurements for market risk remain the same as under the 
1998 amendment.210 
Even the most enthusiastic recognize that Pillar One places new burdens on 
data acquisition and management when it is figured on a less standardized system.211  
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In part, this is probably why the Basel Committee felt the need to add two additional 
pillars. 
Pillar Two concerns banking supervision, which sets out “four key 
supervisory principles.”212  The supervisors are supposed to encourage development 
of internal methods of assessing capital and control methods.213  Supervisors are also 
supposed to intervene as soon as possible if bank levels of capital dip below the 8% 
capital requirement.214  There are no specific directions given on how supervisors are 
supposed to accomplish these tasks.215 
Pillar Three focuses on “market discipline enforced by greater disclosure of 
banks’ financial status and their internal risk management procedures.”216  Banks 
must disclose risk exposure, capital adequacy, methods for computing capital 
requirements, and any additional material information.217  Disclosure is to take place 
twice a year, and quarterly if there is risk exposure, particularly if the bank is involved 
in global activities.218 
C. The Practical Impact of Basel II: A Two-Tiered System Replaces a Level 
Playing Field 
Basel I created a system whereby large and small international banks all 
configured their capital on the same scale.219  Some, including the Basel Committee, 
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believed this would help create a more level playing field.220  Basel II does away with 
this notion entirely.221  Moreover, unlike Basel I, not everyone is poised to adopt the 
new standards.  In fact, the U.S. has decided that only its top ten international banks 
will be required to adopt Basel II, with an additional ten having the option to choose 
between Basel I and Basel II.222  As the Federal Reserve explained,  
Basel I was a major step forward in capital regulation.  Indeed, for 
most banks in this country, Basel I is now—and for the foreseeable 
future will be—more than adequate as a capital framework. . . .  Basel 
I is too simplistic to adequately address the activities of our most 
complex banking institutions.223  
But Basel II does not come without concern.  Some worry Basel II creates a 
complicated system that brings a false sense of security.224  Alan Greenspan worried 
that foreign banks would claim they have proper risk management systems in place, 
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when in actuality they too were far from prepared.225  This is particularly worrisome, 
since the IRB systems help determine the capital charges themselves. 
1. The IMF and the World Bank 
The IMF increasingly views itself as a financial regulator.226  After the 
1997/1998 financial crisis, the IMF and the World Bank set up a new worldwide 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (“FSAP”).227  Moreover, the IMF has plans for 
implementing Basel II around the world.228  One commentator worries, “Handing 
financial regulation back to ‘market discipline’ will nullify the progress that has been 
made to create a system of international regulation.” 229  
2. Benefits May Fall Short 
Some commentators think that while the measuring of regulatory capital will 
be far more complex, the new system does not necessarily promise to be any more 
accurate.230  For developing countries, some believe Basel II will detrimentally affect 
lending “as a consequence of . . . lending to lower rated borrowers.”231  Others 
predict that those who do adopt Basel II will spend an enormous amount figuring 
out the capital requirements, reducing any benefit Basel II might have brought 
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them.232  “Indeed, the Credit Suisse Group estimates compliance costs at an average 
of $15 million per bank for about 30,000 banks worldwide.”233 
The hope is that the IRB model will result in lower capital charges, but at 
what price?  Moreover, Basel II requires that the regulatory capital cannot be 
decreased very rapidly from the Basel I requirements.  A bank must keep the current 
minimum of at least 90% of the Basel I standard for the first year and 80% for the 
second year.234  This is in contrast to the extensive costs associated with 
implementing the new system.  Basel II also requires greater supervision and 
regulatory oversight, something that was not as necessary with the Basel I system.235 
3. And What About in a Crisis? 
Many are predicting that Basel II will work just fine in day-to-day operations, 
but once a crisis hits, the new regulatory system will only increase risks, losses, and 
panic, rather than stabilizing the financial and social environment.236  One person 
predicting danger with Basel II is Lord John Eatwell, Director of the Cambridge 
Endowment for Research in Finance.237  He sees three problems with Basel II and its 
creation of a more risky world.238  He explains that this is because the internal risk 
management systems of individual firms are extremely sensitive to changes in the 
market.239  Eatwell explains and predicts, 
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Good risk managers hold a portfolio of assets that are not volatile 
and the prices of which are not highly correlated—not correlated in 
normal times that is.  But in a crisis the volatility of a given asset may 
rise sharply.  The models will tell all firms to sell.  As all try to sell, 
liquidity dries up.  As liquidity dries up, volatility spreads from one 
asset to another.  Previously uncorrelated assets are now correlated in 
the general sell-off, pumped up by the model driven behaviour of 
other institutions caught in the contagion.  So whilst in normal times 
models may encompass a wide range of behaviour, in extreme 
circumstances they will encourage firms to act as a herd, charging 
toward the cliff edge together. 240 
Eatwell further explains,  
[T]he emphasis on disclosure reduces the diversity of information 
that has in the past created diversity of action.  Today, information is 
ever more readily available, and disclosure of price sensitive 
information is legally required.  Insider dealing on private 
information is, rightly, characterised as market abuse.  But the 
attainment of equal information is bought at a cost - increased 
likelihood of herd behaviour as all react in the same way to the same 
news.241 
Eatwell also believes that a herding mentality will act in the wrong way during a 
crisis: “So, in extremis, when regulation really matters, it will work the wrong way, 
reinforcing destabilising behaviour.”242   
IV. ARE WE ENTERING THE POSTMODERN ERA OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION?  
Basel II is typically viewed as reflecting the increasing complexity within the 
global financial markets.  Because of the Asian Crisis and its aftermath in 1997 and 
1998, and increased regulatory arbitraging, a more complex agreement was needed 
than Basel I and the 1998 amendments.  Is it possible to place this shift in need and 
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response within a larger theoretical context?243  Might we see these developments as a 
movement from a modern to a postmodern system of banking?   
A. The Differences between Pre-modernism, Modernism, and 
Postmodernism 
This Article began with a reference to George Bailey’s bank-related troubles 
in It’s a Wonderful Life.  The banking system represented in that film can be seen as 
something of a precursor to the modern banking world, which is to say a precursor 
to Basel I.  This Section explores Bailey’s pre-modern bank, and what Bailey’s world 
would look like in a modern Basel I and a postmodern Basel II context, to better 
understand just what changes are occurring on a socio-cultural scale.  This Section 
argues that Basel II, while commonly viewed as reflecting an increasingly complex 
globalized financial world, can also be seen as reflecting a postmodern socio-cultural 
condition.  And if we understand the cultural milieu that we inhabit, we can better 
confront the shortcomings and praise the inventiveness of the era.  In short, how 
should we culturally conceptualize the development of Basel I and Basel II in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries?   
It is notable that the crisis that George faces is entirely local.  In fact, it is the 
local nature of the crisis that provides the dramatic foundation for the film’s pathos.  
George believes himself to be alone, facing off against an opponent with far greater 
economic resources than George could hope to muster.  It is the town, his friends 
and neighbors, that ultimately comes to his rescue.  In the end, George is “the richest 
man in town” because his immediate social relations provide a means for combating 
the financial threat that he faces.  In this manner, his social relations take on greater 
significance than his financial standing. 
George’s experience, and the lesson he takes away from it, is only possible 
within a pre-modern banking system.  Mr. Potter’s attempt to foreclose and take 
over George’s savings and loan affects only the two individual institutions and those 
with deposits in George’s savings and loan.  While this may impact those individuals 
who invested in George’s savings and loan, there is no suggestion that such an 
occurrence would translate into any sort of crisis touching other financial 
institutions.  The condition of financial affairs has changed radically over the course 
of the twentieth century as banking and financial practices have grown increasingly 
national and international in character. 
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As noted above, the profound changes in the organization of production, 
distribution, and consumption through the course of and following World War II 
can be seen, in retrospect, as the culmination of “Fordist” practices (named after the 
automobile giant Henry Ford) dating back to innovations initiated in the early 
periods of the twentieth century.244  Only with institutionalization, through the post-
World War II Bretton Woods system, could a stable version of these financial 
arrangements be propagated on a global scale.  With the U.S. domination of the 
West, financially and otherwise, following World War II, this financial regime held 
for several decades, bringing along with it a maturation of the international banking 
system.  Ironically, the very developments bringing it to maturation also sowed the 
seeds of the Bretton Woods system’s collapse in the early years of the 1970s.  The 
modern banking system had become truly global by this time and, as other elements 
fatally fractured the overall financial global system that was in place, the first 
instances of bank failures threatening to swamp interconnected institutions with 
similar crises was experienced. 
Basel I, conceptualized as operating within a modern configuration of 
international banking, reflects a modernist approach to solving problems within and 
among financial institutions.  Bretton Woods sought global stability through the 
institutionalization of international financial controls underpinned by U.S. 
hegemonic dominance.  In spite of the increasingly complex global financial 
conditions appearing in the aftermath of the Bretton Woods collapse, the approach 
Basel I took in response to this crisis proved similarly modernist in perspective.  Like 
Bretton Woods, Basel I embraces a modernist belief that greatest stability can be 
achieved through a centralized authority deploying a controlled solution throughout 
the system.  Even more significant than centralization, however, is the belief under 
Basel I, originated in the attempt to prevent the occurrence of another Herstatt 
Debacle, that a universal, one-size-fits-all system could be formulated that would 
adequately regulate all of the international banks in the same manner. 
In contrast, Basel II moves beyond a modernist paradigm in a number of 
ways.  Though its formulation has been centrally organized, Basel II is a complex, 
convoluted, individualized system that may or may not work to achieve its goals of 
capital stability.  There is not the same confidence in the plan.  Moreover, even the 
design of the agreement reflects a postmodern multivalent chorus of interests and 
concerns, with over 250 comments from outside of the committee dramatically 
altering the final product.  The mix-and-match approach to determining a bank’s 
regulatory capital also reflects a postmodern consciousness.  There is no attempt to 
fit all banks into a universal system; many banks will not even opt into Basel II.  It 
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reflects our world today, wherein one agreement to fit the problem is no longer 
recognized as a viable goal. 
And where does this lead us in looking at Basel I and Basel II?  These 
documents are a reflection of our times, demonstrating not only the needs of 
banking institutions to ward off crises, but also how we conceive the structure of the 
world.  Neither Basel I nor Basel II would have been structured as a solution to 
George Bailey’s problems.  And what of George Bailey in the twenty-first century?  
If his small savings and loan still existed and had not been consolidated into a larger, 
international banking institution, he would not have to implement Basel II.  But he 
might be worried that the large international banks would now have an even greater 
advantage with IRBs instead of a standardized method of determining regulatory 
capital.  And his foe, his contemporary Mr. Potter, likely would cast a far wider 
shadow, now in the form of the international bank.  George also might worry that 
the uneven playing field would become insurmountable under Basel II.  He might be 
grateful that his system of determining the 8% capital requirement is still relatively 
easy and not too costly, since he would still be operating under Basel I.  But he also 
would know that in some way he was being left behind, as the world moved from a 
straightforward, modernist framework—fearful of the world coming apart—to a 
postmodern framework—embracing differences, chaos, and even potential failure in 
favor of individuality, potential profit, and the greater complexities that comprise our 
postmodern world.   
